WRITTEN SUBMISSION AND LIST OF AUTHORITIES IN CIV 1019 OF 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA CIV NO:1019of 2010
HELD AT PERTH
In the matter of an application for Certiorari Orders Nisi to review and quash the decision of the learned President Justice Chaney of the State Administrative Tribunal of Western Australia (SAT), in both his judgments in VR107 of 2008 and VR87 of 2009; the insufficiency of the reasons for judgment impinging on the President’s credibility and his lack of independence as a judge warrants a review of the former decision and a striking off of the latter action as an abuse of the process of court.

And

In the matter of an Application Under Order 67 r.5 of the RSC, 1971 (WA) for Leave to re-file the Amended Papers of the Original Application that were originally rightly considered and rightly refused by the learned Martin CJ on 14.12.2009 in CIV 3068 of 2009 on grounds that the Notice of Originating Motion were then found to be “incomprehensible, prolix and replete with derogatory hyperbole and does not appear to be justified by the facts identified in the Affidavit” but it is now no longer deemed to be so.

EX PARTE: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN

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Date of document: 25th March, 2010.
Date of filing: 25th March, 2010.
Filed on behalf of: The Ex parte Applicant
Prepared by:
NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN Phone: 08 92757440;
387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA Mobile: 0421642735
WA 6059 Emails: nnchin@msn.com;
nnchin09@tpg.com.au


I N D E X

APPLICATION NO LONGER AN ABUSE OF PROCESS: 2
JUSTICE CHANEY AVOIDED GIVING REASONS FOR THE FACTUAL CONFLICTS ISSUES: 5
JUSTICE CHANEY IS NOT INDEPENDENT 6
CREDIBILITY OF JUSTICE CHANEY TO BE IMPEACHED 7
DUTIES OF JUSTICE CHANEY TO DO FAIR JUSTICE 8
THE INEVITABLE OBVIOUS DECISION OF THE FIRST JUDGMENT: 9
THE DEFICIENT FIRST AND SECOND JUDGMENTS 9
WHAT DEFICIENCY OF MY PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE? 10
REVIEW OF THE SECOND JUDGMENT: 10
LPCC IS GUILTY OF ABUSING THE PROCESS OF COURT 11
INTENTIONAL TORT OF ABUSING THE COURT PROCESS: 11
APPLICATION NEITHER FRIVOLOUS NOR VEXATIOUS: 12
THE LAW PROSCRIBES FURTHER REMEDY IN RES JUDICATA PROCEEDINGS: 12
WHY NO FURTHER REMEDY IN THE SECOND JUDGMENT: 15
IS JUSTICE CHANEY BIASED? 16
PREPOSTEROUS PROPOSITION OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT BY LPCC IS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS: 16
COURT TO STRIKE OUT RES JUDICATA PROCEEDINGS AS A DUTY AND NOT AS A DISCRETION 20
LIST OF AUTHORITIES 20
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS: 20
PERTINENT CASES: 21
ARTICLES: 21
CASE LAW: 22



OUTLINE OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BEFORE JUSTICE HEENAN AT 10.20 AM ON 6TH DAY OF APRIL, 2010 AT 10.20 AM AND LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Your Honour:

1. I humbly pray for your leave to file my Application for prerogative writs of certiorari orders, under O.67 r.5 of the Rules of Supreme Court, 1971 (WA) (the RSC).

APPLICATION NO LONGER AN ABUSE OF PROCESS:

2. I humbly submit that this Application in CIV 1019 of 2010 is now no longer an abuse of process as formerly found by the learned Chief Justice in CIV3068 of 2009 as its Original Notice of Originating Motion has now been amended to suit the two-pronged objectives of seeking Certiorari Orders for the Reviews of the First Judgement of Justice Chaney delivered on 17.10.2008 in VR107 of 2008 (the First Judgment) and his Second Judgment in VR87 of 2009 delivered after an “ambushed” trial on 4.11.2009 (the Second Judgment).

3. I am entitled in law to a Review of the First Judgment on the ground that the reason for the Judgment Orders is insufficient as it does not take into account the most salient point of my case affecting the mala-fides of the Pseudo Full Board of the Legal Practice Board (the Pseudo Board).

4. Justice Chaney did not take into account the fact that the Pseudo Board did usurp the lawful authority of that regulator of the legal profession in WA to unreasonably curb my independent legal practice for the unlawful and secret purpose of protecting the cronies of the Pseudo Full Board (the deficient judgment).

5. The deficient judgment had caused me to make unsuccessful Applications for Leave to Appeal in the Court of Appeal and for Special Leave to Appeal to the High Court .

6. The deficient judgment therefore do not contain those issues of facts and law pertaining to the hitherto live issues of the Pseudo Board (the live issues) that would normally bar this Application for Review in Certiorari Orders on the grounds of res judicata or issues estoppel.

JUSTICE CHANEY AVOIDED GIVING REASONS FOR THE FACTUAL CONFLICTS ISSUES:

7. The factual conflicts vis-à-vis the live issues was avoided by Justice Chaney in order to deny me fair justice which he ought to have provided me (as his judicial duty) as a party to the dispute. As a consequence, he was unable to justify the resolution of those factual conflicts in his reasons for his decision . He therefore sought to give me extraneous and irrelevant reasons instead that are not in accord with the dictates of the law; this did not facilitate my subsequent appeals as already explained.

8. For any order decision or ruling of substance that he had issued affecting the rights of the parties to the dispute, the learned Justice Chaney is ordinarily expected to give meaningful reasons especially with regard to the machinations of the Pseudo Board explaining why it had unlawfully and unreasonably curbed my independent law practice. I am disappointed at the unfair justice meted out to me.

9. Had the learned Justice Chaney provided proper reasons for his First Judgment, it would have been more likely than not that his decision would have promoted transparency in the legal process and the proper exercise of his judicial power. Sad to say, he had missed this honourable task by his omitting to do so by design. The law obliges the learned Justice Chaney to write his reasons for his decision in such a way that they do facilitate appellate reviews and reconsiderations; they are well-established.

JUSTICE CHANEY IS NOT INDEPENDENT

10. It is a requirement of the common law that Justice Chaney when dispensing his judicial duties ought to be seen to be INDEPENDENT; the evidence before this Court shows that he has not been so . These requirements do have a constitutional foundation as is suggested in the case law (the judicial independence).

11. The judicial independence includes independence not only from extraneous pressures and influences but also independence from the judge's judicial colleagues where that is necessary to the proper discharge of his judicial functions . His credibility was relied upon by the appellate courts referred to earlier in the reasons for their decisions but in reality his First and Second Judgments do lack credence as the factual conflicts affecting the live issues have been avoided by him altogether. He had therefore misled those appellate courts and as a result fair justice was denied to me.


12. I as a party to this litigation had lost my fundamental human rights to Justice Chaney; the opposing party to this litigation should have been the real Full Board or the legitimate regulator but it was the Pseudo Board which was making its presence felt at all material times. I as a legitimate licensee found myself to be dealing with an imposter and not with the real licensor of my independent legal practice licence.

13. The First and Second Judgments are not effective explanations of how the learned Justice Chaney had arrived at his conclusions because they are based on issues of facts that have been proven to be wrong or falsified . This “expose” is just a tip of the ice-berg of the sad state of affairs prevailing in the legal system of Western Australia.

14. During the trial of the First Judgment case and the preliminary directions hearing of the case of Second Judgment in VR87 of 2009, I had always been constantly urging for the detachment of Justice Chaney so that he would decide my case without passion and always "as though it weren't your fight" yet he did ascend into the arena of conflict and was blinded by the dust of conflict. With all due respect to the learned Justice Chaney, he not only did not exercise detachment and self-restraint but he is also not sceptical about his judicial power.

CREDIBILITY OF JUSTICE CHANEY TO BE IMPEACHED
15. My unsuccessful appeals in the appellate courts arising from the deficient judgment open up an avenue for a review through the prerogative writs of certiorari in this Application in CIV 1019 of 2010. In this context, I quote the learned Justice Brennan who was convinced that the High Court is not bound by its own decision as it could re-express the common law under certain circumstances .

16. Further, this Court like the High Court may change the rule of law that is standing in its way to provide fair justice to me.

DUTIES OF JUSTICE CHANEY TO DO FAIR JUSTICE

17. We now would like to investigate as to why Justice Chaney made those First and Second Judgments in the way he did. The discourse says that a judge “occupy one of the more stressful jobs in contemporary society". This is because he is faced with the task to make a decision which cannot be delegated, he must do so in public and often in dramatic circumstances and is subject to appellate review and criticism and he is obliged to discharge his functions with "impeccable honesty, resolute even-handedness, conspicuous humanity and a high degree of judicial wisdom”; yet he has to succumb and did succumb to his inner wish that he does not stir up the hornet’s nest of the Pseudo Board.

18. It is logical therefore to deduce from the circumstances that the learned Justice Chaney had chosen to ignore the live issues in his First and Second Judgments. Mr. Pino Monaco was the former President of the Law Society of Western Australia just as Justice Chaney was. By the very nature of the circumstances shaping him in our legal society in Western Australia I am being denied fair justice which Justice Chaney has an obligation to provide me and he did not.

19. Justice Chaney came into the position to make that First Judgment as the Deputy President of SAT to relieve the former President Justice Barker who has been promoted to the High Court. There is a sudden change of stance which I felt as the winds of change were blowing against my first case in the First Judgment at its initial stage. The calming effect of the former President was no longer there. The grapevine has it that mine is a case fighting against the Pseudo Board and this will have ramifications upon those who had been actively involved in the protection of their friends after I have caused a stir concerning the pillaging and plundering of Dr. Kheng Su Chan by Mr. Pino Monaco.

20. Therefore the peer pressures are there for Justice Chaney to contend with. He is thus exposed to stress which is a physiological phenomenon. It is a fact of life. The existence of all animals is characterised by the constant presence of stress. No species is more prone to this than human beings . According to experts on the subject, it is a fundamental biological law that animal organisms submitted to stress will respond with a reaction of either fight or flight . Many judges of the past responded to stress by denial - which is a kind of flight. The physiological forces continued to affect their bodies and thinking processes for despite their offices, they could not escape the physiological forces which stress releases.

THE INEVITABLE OBVIOUS DECISION OF THE FIRST JUDGMENT:

21. Enough time has now elapsed since the 19th day of July, 2006 for truth and justice to emanate from the malicious persecution of myself by the Pseudo Board (working through its PAC and the LPCC at the behest of Mr. Pino Monaco who is a former President of the Law Society of WA through Ms. F.H.Walter who had acted both as prosecutor and decision maker to achieve the decision to curb my independent legal practice that is tainted with gross bias), for the obvious decision to be made by this Honourable Court.

22. It arises from the conflicting facts, from which the truth must emerge that I should be exonerated from all the false accusations and that I be free as an independent barrister & solicitor once again. In this context, I quote Lord Justice Ormrod of the English Court of Appeal observed in R Ormrod.
THE DEFICIENT FIRST AND SECOND JUDGMENTS
23. The three rationales for the trial judge Justice Chaney to give reasons are:
(1) to explain why he had ignored the persecuting malice of the Pseudo Board as a fact despite the over-whelming evidence and the admissive conduct of the Board.
(2) to provide public accountability as to why the Pseudo Board is usurping the statutory function of the regulator of the legal profession in WA.
(3) to write his judgment reasons in such a manner so as to facilitate appellate reviews of his First and Second Judgments.

24. It is an undoubted fact that the First and Second Judgments are not sufficient in their entirety and in the context of available evidence made before him, that he had failed to perform faithfully these three functions.

25. If we were to investigate the role of Justice Chaney as the trial judge in terms of the sufficiency of his reasons, we must look at the trial records, the live issues, and the submissions of counsel. The learned Justice is not required to provide detailed explanations of every single finding or descriptions of all evidence which are well settled and uncontroversial. The details of his reasons will depend circumstantially on whether the basis of his decision is clear from the record. It is reasonably obvious that it is not.
26. Justice Chaney failed to explain that he “has seized the substance of the live issues before him” i.e. the issues of whether I was maliciously persecuted by the Pseudo Board. If he did, he would have concluded that the LPCC through the Pseudo Board had committed the intentional tort against me by abusing the process of the courts and the tribunals and had misused all the resources it had before it.
27. The elements of the abuse of process are that I have been maligned and prevented from practicing my profession for no probable cause. The Pseudo Board has violated a sacred public trust which bestows power upon it to file and prosecute legal actions and it is guilty of an intentional tort. As such the Pseudo Board is a threat to the legal system in Western Australia and it deserves the indignation and contempt of a decent society in Western Australia through the agency of this Court.
WHAT DEFICIENCY OF MY PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE?
28. I had been properly engaged in the highest calling of my profession to represent my clients zealously and that I had at all times acted reasonably under the circumstances. The Pseudo Board misused the public right of access to the courts. The elements for this intentional tort are:
28.1 It is the malicious and deliberate misuse or perversion of regularly issued court process through the statutory powers of the LPCC to impose conditions on my practice certificate for no wrongs under s.40 of the former LP Act; that is not justified by the circumstances.
28.2 The abuse of process is through the PAC to influence the LPCC by the Pseudo Board for an oblique purpose of protecting its cronies who have done wrongs to members of the public but they did not receive the censure of the regulator of the legal profession because its function had been usurped.
28.3 The person who abuses the process is interested only in accomplishing some improper purpose of imposing a restraint on my independent legal practice that is collateral to the proper object of the process which is to sift out incompetent and unfit legal practitioners; that offends justice: such as an unjustified or unfounded persecution of a Pseudo Board without lawful authority to curb my independent legal practice.
REVIEW OF THE SECOND JUDGMENT:

29. I am entitled to my defence of Res Judicata and Issues Estoppel in the case of the Second Judgment of Justice Chaney on the ground that I cannot be prosecuted for a FURTHER REMEDY of Professional Misconduct in VR 87 of 2009 once I have already been prosecuted for the mischievous and frivolous allegations of the nebulous “deficiency of my professional knowledge syndrome” in inter alia the VR 137 of 2006 and the VR107 of 2008.

LPCC IS GUILTY OF ABUSING THE PROCESS OF COURT:

30. This court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent its procedures being abused. This Application no longer falls into those categories of abuse of procedures; although the categories remain open, but they usually fall into one of the three categories:
30.1. I have not invoked the court's procedures for the prerogative writ orders of certiorari for an illegitimate purpose whereas the LPCC is doing so through an obvious conspiratorial link with the judge of the tribunal; this is without a doubt :

30.2. I am not using the court's procedures in an unjustifiably oppressive manner to the LPCC and to the Pseudo Board; it is undoubted that they have done this to me.
30.3. I am not using the court's procedures for the purpose of bringing the administration of justice into disrepute; it is undoubted the pseudo Board through the LPCC is doing this very thing which I am not doing to them.

INTENTIONAL TORT OF ABUSING THE COURT PROCESS:

31. The malicious persecution of me by the Pseudo Board for the protection of its cronies arises from the institution of its intention to unreasonably curb my independent law practice so that innocent members of the public inter alia my son Paul Chin, Dr. Kheng Su Chan and Mr. Alessandro Bertini could be pillaged and plundered by erring members of the legal profession with impunity. It is climaxing with the res judicata proceedings in VR87 of 2009 whilst my Application for Special Leave to the High Court in P36 of 2009 was in progress (the current injustice). This has now been dismissed by the High Court of Australia on 10.3.2010. This dismissal relied upon the credibility of the trial judge Justice Chaney in VR107 of 2008; this current injustice has not been dealt with by the High Court yet as they are separate issues from that Application for Special Leave to Appeal. Therefore, I should be able to go back to the High Court to address the live issues once again as they are not considered in the First Judgment.

32. This Court should beware that any procedural step taken by the LPCC in the course of these proceedings have apparently been properly instituted by the Pseudo Board, yet they are still capable of being an abuse of the court's process .
APPLICATION NEITHER FRIVOLOUS NOR VEXATIOUS:
33. My Application in CIV 1019 of 2010 is neither frivolous nor vexatious as the evidence before this Honourable Court will show; because it has a reasonable chance of succeeding, and it would not bring hardship on the opposite party to defend my claim that the Pseudo Board is unreasonably curbing my independent legal practice for the purpose of protecting its cronies .
34. My claim is not frivolous as it has legal merit and is not manifestly insufficient or futile. It is not based on absurd legal theories, does not involve superabundance of motions, nor is it uncivil or harassing to the courts, nor does it claim extreme remedies but is based upon the underlying justification of facts .
35. It is not vexatious in that it is not aimed to harass or subdue my adversary in the Pseudo Board nor is there any unwarranted filing of meritless motions.
THE LAW PROSCRIBES FURTHER REMEDY IN RES JUDICATA PROCEEDINGS:
36. Brett MR , dismissed an argument that the doctrine of res judicata applies only where there is a formal record . There are many court-like tribunals like the PAC, the LPCC and the SAT tribunals which sat before Judge Eckert and Justice Chaney which tried these issues of facts and law and they all came to the conclusion that there was no professional misconduct on my part. How come Justice Chaney now wants to review his own decision and he had already done so in the Second Judgment on 4.11.2009 by pronouncing a prejudgment? He had already adjudged those same issues of facts and law and he is now blatantly denying me fair justice once again by denying that that I do have my justifiable defence of res judicata and issues estoppel as explained earlier. He is coming as a judge again albeit as an ex-functus officio judge in the res judicata proceedings in VR87 of 2009 which is an abuse of the court process by the LPCC. As a result, his decision in the Second Judgment is without jurisdiction and need not be complied with.
37. For Res Judicata to be binding, the following conditions must be observed:
• identity in the thing at suit – the issue of my “fitness to practice” as a barrister and solicitor came to be considered under both s.39 and s. 40 of the former LP Act. I have never been persecuted nor prosecuted for unfitness in s.39 of the former LP Act.
• identity of the cause at suit – all those issues that have been the subject of litigation at the various levels, namely, the court like tribunals of the Professional Affairs Committee, the Legal Profession Complaints Committee (the LPCC), the SAT tribunal before Judge Eckert in VR137 of 2006, the SAT tribunal before Judge Chaney in VR107 of 2008, the Inquiry Panel of the Pseudo Board that was ill-constituted; the Consent Judgment obtained in CACV 43 of 2007 was dishonoured by the Pseudo Board, the dismissal of my Leave to Appeal in CACV 105 of 2008, the dismissal of the High Court Special Leave to Appeal in P36 of 2009 – the malicious and wrongful allegations by the LPCC that I was deficient in my professional knowledge that should not entitle the Pseudo Board to usurp the powers of the regulator of the legal profession to impose conditions on my practice certificate under s.40 of the LP Act divested of s.39 which should have been employed to question my unfitness to practice if any.
• identity of the parties to the action: Nicholas Ni Kok Chin as the legal practitioner and the Legal Practice Board as the regulator of the legal profession acting through its Pseudo Board which did not have the legitimate majority consent of the legitimate regulator of the legal profession in WA in accordance with s.10 and 11 of the former LP Act and regulations 15 and 17 of the former Legal Practice Board Rules, 2004 (the invalid authority).
• identity in the designation of the parties involved; Nicholas Ni Kok Chin as the licensee who has the legitimate expectations that his licence as a qualified legal practitioner be renewed without illegal constraints and the Legal Practice Board of WA as the licensor whose legitimate authority should not have been usurped by a Pseudo Board.
• whether the judgment was final:
o Yes: each of the decisions of the court-like tribunals of the PAC, the LPCC, the SAT tribunals in VR137 of 2006 and in VR107 of 2008. The conditions for consent judgment agreed to by the Pseudo Full Board was provided to Registrar Eldred and is therefore obtainable from the court records of Justice Steytler’s consent judgment in CACV 43 of 2007 given on 26.9.2007. It was dishonoured by the Pseudo Board. Appellate courts dismissal for Leave to appeal the First Judgment was based on the credibility of Justice Chaney. Credibility debunked because it did not address the live issues. Therefore appellate courts dismissals do not bar further proceedings on the live issues.
o No: Inquiry Panel of the Pseudo Board sat on 3.4.2009 was improperly constituted; Justice Chaney’s ambushed trial in Second Judgment on 4.11.2009 is without jurisdiction. This warrants this current application in CIV 1019 of 2010 for Certiorari orders to quash and review the First and Second Judgments and stay the Second Judgment .
• whether the parties were given full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue: No: at the court-like tribunals because those decisions were made in absentia.
• Yes: all other proceedings except VR 87 of 2009 before Justice Chaney.
WHY NO FURTHER REMEDY IN THE SECOND JUDGMENT:

38. The question before this court is whether the Second Judgment is without jurisdiction. It is reasonably found to have contradicted the law at paragraph 2 .

39. The Pseudo Board acting through the LPCC is without legitimate authority to seek the further remedy of “professional misconduct” in the Second Judgment other than what it had already obtained in the first action.

40. It is clear that the rationale in the Second Judgment to give the green light to the LPCC to continue the malicious persecution against me in its later stages is without jurisdiction and its consequent orders need not be complied with; I am therefore asking for the consequential relief for the damages of an intentional tort to abuse the process of court by the LPCC from this Honourable Court

IS JUSTICE CHANEY BIASED?

41. Is the learned Justice Chaney and the Honourable Members of the LPCC able to answer my twenty one questions as posed in my response letters dated 15.3.2010 and 17.3.2010 . A reasonable answer from them should be presented to this court and they will be read together with all the evidence presented before this Court. A failure to answer them faithfully by the learned Justice Chaney and the LPCC would naturally imply the vindication of my rights as an independent barrister and solicitor. The learned Judge of the Second Judgment has already accepted that he is indeed biased and has so relinquished his job for his Deputy President as indicated by the email letter .

PREPOSTEROUS PROPOSITION OF PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT BY LPCC IS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS:

42. Section 402 of the Legal Profession Act, 2008 (the Act) defines Unsatisfactory professional Conduct as being a failure to reach the standard of conduct in competency and diligence of a reasonable legal practitioner. Section 403 of the Act takes a step further in defining professional misconduct as an aggravated form of unsatisfactory conduct qualified by its quality of being consistent or substantial.

43. Therefore, the essentialities of professional misconduct are in the following terms:
a) A failure to reach the standard of competence and diligence of a legal practitioner expected of by a member of the public (the failure);
b) The failure must be either consistent or substantial;
c) The conduct vis-à-vis this failure is either outside the practice of law or within the practice of the law, which renders the legal practitioner an unfit person (the unfitness).
d) The unfitness is to be defined by the s.8 suitability matters of the Act.


44. Looking at the unsuitability matters or my unfitness to independent legal practice as a barrister and solicitor, I can find none of them disqualifies me. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the learned Justice Chaney to make the predeterminations that I was guilty of professional misconduct without a trial and this happened during the ambushed trial on 4.11.2009. Unless His Honour is indeed imbued with persecuting malice and is working hand in glove with the LPCC , this state of affairs cannot happen. I keep asking myself if it were a crime for the learned Justice to be conspiring with members of the Pseudo Board for the purpose of persecuting me for no professional misconduct and for pronouncing that I am guilty of professional misconduct where there was no trial as yet.

45. The res judicata issues of facts and law in the current res judicata proceedings in VR87 of 2009 have merged with those of the previous judgments and as such they no longer have any independent existence for Her Honour Judge Pritchard and Member Jordan to deliberate upon, as arranged for by Justice Chaney in his directions hearing held on 16.2.2010 for 18.5.2010 for three days, despite my protestestations.

COURT TO STRIKE OUT RES JUDICATA PROCEEDINGS AS A DUTY AND NOT AS A DISCRETION
46. I urge this court to strike out the res judicata proceedings of the LPCC in VR 87 of 2009 not as a discretionary measure, but as its duty. It is an abuse of process which results in an intentional tort to me and it should therefore not be condoned by this Honourable Court .


NICHOLAS N CHIN – SOLICITOR LITIGANT IN PERSON


LIST OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS:
1. O.67 r.5 of the Rules of Supreme Court, 1971 (WA)
2. Rr. 15 and 17 of the Legal Practice Board Rules, 2004 (WA)
3. S.18 for Misconduct of Public Officers under the Corruption and Crime Commission Act, 2003 (WA).
4. Ss. 10, 11, 39 and 40 of the Legal Practice Act, 2003 (WA)
5. Ss. 8, 402 and 403 of the Legal Profession Act (2008) (WA).
6. Ss. 83, 84 and 121 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 (WA).

PERTINENT CASES:
7. First Judgment of Justice Chaney at: http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/SAT/SATdcsn.nsf in CHIN and WEST AUSTRALIAN LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [2008] WASAT 252
8. Second Judgment of Justice Chaney at: http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/SAT/SATdcsn.nsf in LEGAL PROFESSION COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE and CHIN [2009] WASAT 219 referred to as the res judicata point decision by Justice Chaney.
9. The First Appellate Court Decision at http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/supreme/supdcsn.nsf in CHIN -v- LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2009] WASCA 117
10. The Second Appellate Court Decision at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCASL/2010/4.html in the case of: Chin v Legal Practice Board of Western Australia [2010] HCASL 4 (10 March 2010).
11. The decision of Justice Hasluck re: Mr.Timothy Robin Thies: http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/supreme/supdcsn.nsf in the case of: RE MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256;
12. The decision of the Court of Appeal in CACV 107 of 2008 re Mr. David Taylor: at http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/supreme/supdcsn.nsf in CHIN -v- HALL [2009] WASCA 216
13. Selective prosecutions by the LPCC: RE BERTINI; EX PARTE BERTINI [2010] WASC 34 at http://decisions.justice.wa.gov.au/supreme/supdcsn.nsf
14. No further remedy to Plaintiff in actions barred by the defence of res judicata: http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/q036.htm - the “Lectric Law Library
15. The blogspot of Nicholas N Chin by Googling: “nicholasnchin” for pertinent documents relating to this case at . http://www.nicholasnchin.com/
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 14.1. See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 10; European Convention on Human Rights, art 6(1); American Convention on Human Rights, art 8(1); and African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art 7(1)(b).

ARTICLES:

17. Cannon, W: The Wisdom of the Body (1939);
18. Ellis T and Showalter C: "Work-Related Stress in American Trial Judges" 22 Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 71 (1994);
19. Frivolous Litigation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frivolous_litigation
20. Hand, L: "The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization" in The Spirit of Liberty (1959), 118 at 121;
21. Hand, L"Thomas Walter Swan" in The Spirit of Liberty" (1959), 158 at 165;
22. Kirby J: JUDGING: REFLECTIONS ON THE MOMENT OF DECISION: By the Hon Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG CHARLES STURT UNIVERSITY FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REASONING AND DECISION-MAKING WAGGA WAGGA, 4 DECEMBER 1998 at website: http://www.highcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_charles.htm
23. Lectric Law Library: http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/q036.htm - the “Lectric Law Library
24. Ormrod, J: "Judges and the Process of Judging" in Jubilee Lectures, University of Birmingham (1981) 181 at 187-188 cited Watson, above n 64, at 947;
25. Shanks, H: The Art and Craft of Judging: The Decisions of Judge Learned Hand (1968) at 20;
26. Vexatious Litigation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vexatious_litigation;
27. Watson, A: "Some Psychological Aspects of the Trial Judge's Decision-Making" 39 Mercer L Rev 937 at 938 (1988) and at 940;


CASE LAW:

28. Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ said of certiorari, at 580-581:
29. Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585 at 604-605;
30. Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 318-321;
31. Evans v The Queen (2006) 164 A Crim R 489 at 522 [272];
32. Farley vs Ireland & Others, [1997] IESC 60 per Justice Barron at page 1521
33. Fingleton v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 166 at 229-230 [187]-[191];
34. Halabi v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) 17 NSWLR 26;
35. Henderson v. Henderson ((94) [1843] EngR 917; (1843) 3 Hare 100 at 115 [1843] EngR 917; (67 ER 313 at 319)
36. Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police (1982) AC 529 at 536.
37. In re May (65) (1885) 28 Ch D 516 at 518.
38. Jacobs v London County Council [1950] AC 361 at 369;
39. McKechnie v Campbell (1996) 17 WAR 62
40. Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 at 388;
41. Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 at 666
42. Public Service Board of NSW v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656 at 666;
43. R v Fleming [1998] HCA 68 at [22];
44. Rado, S: Adaptational Psychodynamics (1969) at 25-47;
45. Rees v Crane [1994] 2 AC 173 at 187-188 (PC);
46. Rogers v R [1994] HCA 42; (1994) 181 CLR 251; (1994) 123 ALR 417; (1994) 68 ALJR 688; (1994) 74 A Crim R 462 (28 September 1994) at paragraph 13
47. Smits (2006) 227 CLR 423 at 461 [111] Referring to Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 362-363 [79]-[82], 372-373 [115]-[117];
48. Smits v Roach (2006) 227 CLR 423 at 459-460 [104];
49. Walton v. Gardiner ((130) [1992] HCA 12; (1992) 177 CLR 378 at 393.
50. Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 at 573 [160];