AFFIDAVIT OF NICHOLAS N CHIN CALLING FOR RECUSSAL OF JUSTICE KEN MARTIN IN CIV 1981 OF 2010

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA OM NO: …… OF 2010
HELD AT PERTH
In the matter of the apprehended bias of the Learned Justice
Kenneth Martin and his jurisdictional errors in dealing with
CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 through his refusal
to take into account relevant matters and in taking into account
irrelevant matters; just as though His Honour was reasonably
seen to descending into the arena of conflict by taking sides
with the opposite party and was thus blinded by the dust of
conflict; he consequently denied the Applicant, his natural
justice.



EX PARTE: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFFIDAVIT OF NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN IN SUPPORT OF HIS NOTICE OF ORIGINATING MOTION CALLING FOR THE RECUSAL OF JUSTICE KENNETH MARTIN DATED 28TH DAY OF JUNE, 2010.


Case Manager: The Hon Justice Kenneth Martin
Date of Document: 28th May, 2010
Filed on behalf of: The Plaintiff
Date of Filing: 26 May, 2010

Prepared by:
Nicholas Ni Kok Chin
387, Alexander Drive
DIANELLA WA 6059
Phone: 08 927567440
Mobile: 0421642735
Email: nnchin@msn.com


Annexure Description Page No.
AF Affidavit of Applicant sworn 29.06.2010 in support of Notice of Originating Motion. 1-11
NNC-1 Transcript of proceedings before Justice Kenneth Martin (the Second Judge) dated 30.4.2010 in CIV 1112 of 2007 and CIV 1903 of 2008 in 15 pages from pages 1 to 15. 12-27
NNC-2 Transcript of proceedings before the Second Judge dated 17.6.2010 in CIV 1903 of 2007 -20 pgs from pages 16 to 36. 28-47
NNC-3 Transcript of proceedings before the Second Judge dated 13.5.2010 in CIV 1112 of 2007 in 16 pages from pages 25-31. 48-53
NNC-4 Transcript of proceedings before the Second Judge dated 13.5.2010 in CIV 1903 of 2008 in 14 pages from pages 52-66. 54-68
NNC-5 Transcript of proceedings in both CIV1112 of 2007 of 2008 dated 13.5.2010 in 8 pages from pages 16 to 24 sent to me by post after my complaint that the transcript had been tampered with, from the Court Technology Officer of the Supreme Court of WA with cover letter dated 19.5.2010.
69-74
NNC-6 My email letter to the Associate of the Second Judge dated 13.5.2010 requesting for a copy of the transcript and the Varied Orders of Justice Kenneth Martin to Justice Hasluck Orders in both cases. 75
NNC-7-1 to NNC-7-3 My email letter to the Associate of the Second Judge dated 17.5.2010 complaining about the incomplete transcript was responded to by Leon Firios dated 18.5.2010 indicating that my complaint was misconceived. 76-78
NNC-8-1 to NNC-8-2. The Associate Civil Record of the Associate of the Second Judge dated 13.5.2010 in CIV 1903 of 2008. 79-80
NNC-9-1 to NNC-9-6 The judgment of the Second Judge that did not take into account of the written submissions of the Applicant in CIV 1903 of 2008 and that of his son the Second Defendant in CIV 1112 of 2007 which is effectively a prejudgment of the whole issue of denying the Applicant of his natural justice. 81-86
NNC-10-1 to NNC-10-6 The First Defendant’s Outline of Written Submission dated 10.6.2010 in relation to his Chamber Summons dated 12.5.2010 requesting for Security of Costs which has not been decided yet by Justice Kenneth Martin as at the date of filing of this Affidavit in 6 pages. 87-92
NNC-11-1 to NNC-11-2 Letter from the Applicant to the Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court of Western Australia copied to the Associate of the Second Judge dated 28.5.2010 requesting for His Honour to recuse himself from further hearing CIV 1903 of 2008 on the ground of apprehended bias. 93-94
NNC-12-1 to NNC-12-18 Written Outline of Submissions by the Applicant dated 24.6.2010 in response to the Written Submission of the First Defendant’s submissions dated 10.6.2010 as indicated above in 18 pages. 95-112
NNC-13-1 to NNC-15 My response letter to the LPCC regarding the Complaint of the First Department in respect of my ability to represent my son the Second Defendant in these proceedings including the CIV112 of 2010 dated 29.10.2010. 113-127

INDEX PAGE NUMBERS
SECOND STAGE - THE SUBS.36(4) MCA PROCEEDINGS: 3
APPREHENDED BIAS OF THE SECOND JUDGE 4
DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL CAVEAT 4
REFERENCE TO CAVEAT NOT HAVING BEEN REMOVED ON 1.5.2008: 5
PLAINTIFF BE MADE DEFENDANT IN THE CAVEAT CASE 5
IMPROPER MOTIVE FOR THE SECURITY COSTS APPLICATION 5
THE PRE-JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDGE 5
REASONS FOR APPLICANT TO BE MADE DEFENDANT IN THE CAVEAT CASE 5
MISCONCEPTION OF CAVEATABLE INTERESTS: 5
ZERO SUM DEBT FALSE CLAIM IS THE HANDMAID OF THE DURESS GUN CAVEAT CASE WIELDED BY FIRST DEFENDANT TO ACHIEVE AN IMPROPER PURPOSE 5
REASON FOR APPREHENDED BIAS OF SECOND JUDGE 5
PAUL UNDER UNDUE INFLUENCE OF HIS FATHER TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT: 5
FIRST DEFENDANT RETAINER TERMINATED BY APPLICANT 5
PAUL TERMINATED RETAINER OF FIRST DEFENDANT 5
APPLICANT - NO PUBLIC ROLE AS SOLICITOR - SOLE ACTOR FOR HIMSELF AND INACTIVE SON 5

I, Nicholas Ni Kok Chin of No. 387, Alexander Drive, DIANELLA, WA 6059, Western Australia, Barrister & Solicitor (currently not certificated), being duly sworn make oath and say as follows:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled proceedings and I swear this Affidavit in support of my Application for my Mandamus and Certiorari Orders Nisi, inter-alia for His Honour Justice Kenneth Martin (the Second Judge) to recuse himself from further hearing the second part of the subs.36(4) Magistrates Court Act, 2004 (MCA) proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008.
2. The facts herein are true and correct, to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Where I identify the source of facts stated as other than from my own personal knowledge, I believe such facts to be true and correct.
3. The s.36 MCA proceedings for reviews of the non-jurisdictional decisions of the Duress-vitiated Registrar Wilde Involuntary Consent Judgment in FR417 of 2007, of Magistrates Musk in FR944 of 2008, of Commissioner Herron’s in DC Appeal No.6 of 2008 of Musk and of Magistrates Michelides in the appeal of the Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment, have been completed by the Justice Hasluck pursuant to subs. 36(1) of the MCA (The First Judge).

SECOND STAGE - THE SUBS.36(4) MCA PROCEEDINGS:

4. The second stage or the subs. 36(4) MCA proceedings is currently before the learned Justice Kenneth Martin (the Second Judge) which came for directions hearing on the 30.4.2010, 13.5.2010 and 17.6.2010. The extent of these proceedings conducted by the Second Judge is recorded in the transcripts enumerated above in the Annexed documents from NNC1 to NNC-5. I as the Applicant in these proceedings am not happy at the manner they are being conducted. I have consequently called for the Second Judge to recuse himself without success.
5. I believe that the apprehended bias of the Second Judge is apparent from the transcript of the proceedings as indicated above and the contents of my letter to the Principal Registrar dated 28.5.2010 in Annexure: NNC-11 which explains my 12-point argument as to why there should be that recusal.

APPREHENDED BIAS OF THE SECOND JUDGE

6. In addition, some further points of apprehended bias of the Second Judge can be obtained from my 18 page Outline of Written Submission referred to Annexure: NNC-12-1 to NNC-12-18 and also in my Affidavit containing 140 pages sworn dated and filed 26.5.2010 which crossed his Honour’s decision to bar me from being heard in the Caveat case of CIV 1112 of 2007 despite the fact that I was granted by the First Judge permission to appear for and on behalf of my son, the Second Defendant whilst my son remained inactive on the ground that he was never voluntary in his solicitor client-relationship with the First Defendant from the start and also with the consent of the First Defendant’s barrister Mr. Scott Ellis who must not now reneged that that consent was granted only for the mediation process which went sour. Once it is granted and let no one approbate and reprobate.

DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL CAVEAT

7. I also seek to amend my proposed order 5 found at page 17 of NNC-12 at the concluding part of my submissions which I want this Court to consider to the effect that the damages for the wrongful caveat be amended to $100.00 per day to be calculated as from the day the unlawful caveat was lodged on the 11.12.2006 until the 16.6.2010. The unlawful Caveat lasted for 1283 days when it was finally removed at the suggestion of the Second Judge. On 21.6.2010 I made an inquiry at the front counter desk of the Midland Office of the Registrar of Titles and I was informed that the unlawful Caveat of the First Defendant was no longer there. The special damages for the wrongful caveat is from the day the First Defendant caused the unlawful caveat K17968 to be lodged upon the home property of my son whilst he the First Defendant was without a caveatable interests to do so, until the day when it was lawfully removed on the 16th day of June, 2010 as a result of the insistence of the Second Judge in these proceedings after the First Defendant had been notified of the quantified damages he was causing the Second Defendant by wrongfully clogging up his asset. The total quantified special damages liability of the First Defendant is therefore calculated to be in the sum of one hundred and twenty thousand three hundred and eighty dollars ($128,300.00) .

REFERENCE TO CAVEAT NOT HAVING BEEN REMOVED ON 1.5.2008:

8. At page 30 of NNC-3 there is a reference by the Second Judge to Order 42 r.8 of the RSC which implicates the Learned Master Sanderson refusal to release the wrongful caveat in the proceedings in CIV1112 of 2008 when the Second Defendant was physically present as a Defendant litigant in person before the learned Master. I do not understand the reasoning of the Second Judge as I was present when my son was present on the 1.5.2008 before the learned Master as my son appeared in person. Mr. Dean Elek-Roser, the solicitor who appeared on behalf of the First Defendant was then telling Master Sanderson that the caveat could not be removed on account of an ongoing dispute with the Applicant. So I need to put the records straight on this point.

PLAINTIFF BE MADE DEFENDANT IN THE CAVEAT CASE

9. I was troubled by the Second Judge’s unreasoning conduct in refusing me to be heard regarding the issues affecting my son’s Caveat Case in CIV 1112 of 2007 under circumstances when my son was never involved voluntarily in those proceedings as it was I who had caused him to be entangled by the First Defendant. See Annexure NNC-13. As a result of this unjustified barring me from me from being heard in my own case, purportedly on the excuse that it was my son’s case which had led me to have some trouble in obtaining the relevant transcript from the Associate of the learned Justice Kenneth Martin. See Annexure: NNC-6 and NNC-7.
10. My protestations have led to the current proceedings being stagnated with the decision as to the Security of Costs Order being reserved. I believe this to be a frivolous and vexatious Application for Security Costs by the First Defendant dated 12.5.2010 made before the Second Judge. See the outline of written submissions in Annexure: NNC-10 by the First Defendant for which I have made my submissions in response in Annexure NNC-12.

IMPROPER MOTIVE FOR THE SECURITY COSTS APPLICATION

11. This Security Cost Application has a hidden motive to stop the Learned Second Judge from doing his duties or to exercise his discretion correctly pursuant to the principle of the common law that is being enunciated by His Honour Justice Beech in the West Australian case of Re An Application Under The Magistrates Court Act 2004; Ex Parte Brecker [2007] WASC 151 at para.58 . It was an unfair step in the proceedings taken by the First Defendant for no justifying circumstances to that prevents His Honour from exercising the correct discretion in the current subs. 36(4) MCA proceedings. This unfair motive is reasonably apparent in that the Application is seeking for the security of some Null Costs Orders of Commissioner Herron, Magistrate Musk and Michelides that emanates from jurisdictional errors. They are therefore unenforceable in our courts system.
12. I have explained my position with regard to the shady dealing of the Application for Security Costs by the First Defendant in my Response Outline of Written Submission in 18 pages in Annexure: NNC-12 and it is indeed I who should be seeking security of costs order for the Second Defendant instead of him seeking it from me.

THE PRE-JUDGMENT OF THE SECOND JUDGE

13. The barring of my being heard in my own case in the Caveat Case by the Second Judge culminated in the written judgment of the Second Judge heard and delivered on 13.5.2010 and published on 25.5.2010 in Annexure NNC-9 in 6 pages. I would term this as a prejudgment of the Second Judge because it crossed my 140 page Affidavit filed and sworn and served 26.5.2010 as it also did not take into considerations the respective written submissions of the Second Defendant and the Applicant. If it did take the relevant considerations into account and not take the irrelevant considerations into account or it was guided by the relevant considerations in those two written submissions, it would not have been called a pre-judgement with due respect to His Honour the Second Judge.
14. At paragraph 5 of my 26th May 2010 Affidavit, I adopted the contents of the Affidavit of the Second Defendant of 60 pages into my Affidavit in respect of CIV1112 of 2007 which was not accepted by the Second Judge although it was signed by Paul in his own case as a litigant in person. It is to be noted that the Summons in Chambers in the Caveat Case was subsequently altered into the Second Defendant’s name as a litigant in person and yet it was unreasonably rejected by the Second Judge thus denying the Second Defendant his natural justice. It was a neither here nor there situation, Paul was not allowed to be a litigant in person and I was not allowed to help him as a McKenzie friend. This is an anomalous situation arising from the apprehended bias of the Second Judge.

REASONS FOR APPLICANT TO BE MADE DEFENDANT IN THE CAVEAT CASE

15. Paragraphs 22 and 23 of the 26th May, 2010 Affidavit explain to the Second Judge the reasons why I should be included as the Second Defendant in CIV1112 of 2007 in exchange for my son the Second Defendant to be included as the Second Defendant in CIV1903 of 2008.
16. Paragraphs 24 with 20 sub-paragraphs explains the reasons as to why my son the Second Defendant was never the party involved in the ZERO DEBT false claim of the First Defendant on the ground that he was an involuntary person who came into the picture because he was under my undue influence. Therefore, I am liable to my son for getting him into the picture and similarly, I should also be the person liable for pulling him out of the picture. Hence, the reasons why the two cases i.e. CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 should be consolidated to achieve the purpose of quieting all claims arising from one transaction or event in accordance with Order 83 of the RSC.
17. The Second Judge is not quite correct in his reasoning that that the two cases cannot be consolidated because they are different, one dealing with the ZERO SUM DEBT CLAIM and the other dealing with the caveat of the First Defendant who has an arguable interests in land. His Honour misconceived this issue as the two cases are about quelling all claims arising arising from the ZERO SUM DEBT.

MISCONCEPTION OF CAVEATABLE INTERESTS:

18. The Second Judge misconceived the fact that was quoted in his pre-judgment at para. 10 at page 5 of that Prejudgment in Annexure NNC-9 concerning the judgment of the case of Bashford v Bashford [2008] WASC 138 by His Honour Beech J who was referring to an “arguable caveatable interests” which the Second Judge mistook as “an arguable interests in land”.

ZERO SUM DEBT FALSE CLAIM IS THE HANDMAID OF THE DURESS “GUN” CAVEAT CASE WIELDED BY FIRST DEFENDANT TO ACHIEVE AN IMPROPER PURPOSE

19. Therefore it is clear that the two cases should be consolidated because it revolves around the single issue of a ZERO SUM DEBT CLAIM to which the First Defendant was at all material times using the Caveat Case of CIV1112 of 2007 as a “gun” of duress which resulted in his achieving the Registrar Wilde Involuntary Consent Judgment in FR417 of 2007 and causing the First Defendant to be paid the duress-vitiated compromise sum of $11,500.00 which is the subject of the current dispute in these proceedings.
20. The Second Judge is now stating that if I am not happy with his decision in barring me from the Caveat Case and his not consolidating the two cases into one cases, I am free to appeal. I understand that this is a jurisdictional error of the Second Judge and therefore I am making this application for Certiorari, mandamus and prohibitions orders nisi before another Justice of the Supreme Court.

REASON FOR APPREHENDED BIAS OF SECOND JUDGE

21. The Second Judge is biased on the grounds of his seeming interests in the First Defendant’s case, his conduct at closing all doors and avenues of justice to the Applicant by denying him from being heard in the Caveat Case and giving unreasonable reasons as to why the two cases cannot be consolidated, the reasonable presumption that his attitude is being shaped by extraneous information that is not grasped from the court records and perhaps they had influenced his mind from external sources and his general leanings towards the First Defendant’s case. All these reasonably perceived biased are being exacerbated by the Second Judge proclivity not to fully understand the Applicant’s case including the special circumstance that he had made a written prejudgment in this case on 13.5.2010. This is further coupled by his referring to the bona fides of the belief of the Second Defendant that he has a genuine claim for unmet legal fees leading to his wanting the First Defendant to be cross-examined on irrelevant matters when the crux of the issue is solely about a ZERO SUM DEBT FALSE CLAIM in FR417 of 2007 case pursuing a NON-CONSENSUAL VARIED COSTS SOLICITORS AGREEMENT and aided by the duress “GUN” of the Caveat case in CIV1112 of 2007 which should be consolidated into one case in the current subs.36(4) proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008 for the purpose of quieting all claims that arose from one single event or transaction i.e. the ZERO SUM FALSE DEBT FALSE CLAIM. Further, the Second Judge is reasonably perceived to have been advocating for the First Defendant and defending his perceived rights of the First Defendant against the evidence available before him when he ought to have generally favoured the Applicant by adopting the normally under circumstances where there are no justifying circumstances advanced by the First Defendant.
22. I do not agree that there should be a cross-examination at all or if there is a cross-examination, it should not drag into itself into other irrelevant issues as the incontrovertible evidence are already available before His Honour in the Affidavit material of the First Defendant filed on 7.10.2009 (the Thies Affidavit).
23. There is only one issue i.e. there was the NON-CONSENSUAL VARIED SOLICITORS COSTS AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) entered into by the Applicant with the First Defendant on the 3.11.2004. The First Defendant was happy to receive a $500.00 deposit upon the signing of THE AGREEMENT and he pretended that there was consensus ad idem under circumstances where there was none.
24. The First Defendant does not deny the existence of the pre-contractual terms as contained in the Applicant’s email dated 25.10.2010 which is found at page 93 of the Thies Affidavit (the pre-contractual terms). At page 94 of same, on 27.10.2004 he again agreed to the finer terms of the pre-contractual terms.
25. On 31.10.2004, he again pretended to agree to the pre-contractual terms at page 95. He did this again on 1.11.2004, when he confirmed his agreement to those pre-contractual terms at page 96. He repeated his agreement on 3.11.2004 when he pretended signed a receipt for the $500.00 which he wanted very much to receive as deposit from the Applicant. As an officer of the court, the question is why he was not honest enough to say he did not agree before he received the $500.00 deposit? He misled the Applicant to think that there was consensus ad idem from him when he signed the receipt on 3.11.2004 and also signed an additional clause that he will not be paid for any work unless the Applicant agrees to pay him and he agrees that the work he is going to do is going to be worth its payment and as directed by the Applicant. He agreed that the Applicant is to approve all billings and time-costing and he confirm it many times in his email correspondence with the Applicant. These pre-contractual terms he knows very well will vary his Solicitor Costs Agreement, without which, he will not be paid for his future work is found at page 97. So, in pages 98 to 101 we find that he had prepared his Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement dated 3.11.2004 which the Applicant signed. Email correspondence between Applicant and First Defendant on 3.11.2004 and 4.11.2004 at pages 102 and 103 do not indicate that he had disagreed with the THE AGREEMENT he voluntarily entered into. At pages 104 and 105, he sent a bill for $657.00 and therefore there was therefore a debt of $157.00 owed the Applicant because he breached THE AGREEMENT. At page 106, he acknowledges that the Applicant retains his right to approve his billing and time costing as he agreed that there was no money to be paid to him until trial. So the sum of $157.00 is mutually agreed to be paid to him only at the trial of the case and he did intend to bring it trial. But he did not bring it to trial and he wanted more and more monies and he wanted to continue breaching the terms of the AGREEMENT.
26. At page 108 at paragraph 8, the Second Defendant, my son Paul told the First Defendant the truth that the First Defendant was dealing with me and the effect of his conversation which Paul had with him had caused Paul to be drawn involuntarily to into an unconscionable deal with the First Defendant, having regard to Paul’s mental health background which Mr. Thies knows as they are contained within the briefs.
27. Paul was told to see Mr. Thies and he was told to sign a mirror agreement which is THE AGREEMENT but he did it involuntarily and only signed it after he was told by me that it is okay to sign and that Mr. Thies would not be able to caveat his home property because there was no specific mention of that property in THE AGREEMENT to enable him to have a caveatable interests in that caveat property.
28. At pages 104 & 105 on 4.11.2010 Mr. Thies reneged on his agreement that there was no more to pay until trial and asked for an additional sum of $157.00 in Invoice 5022 on top of the deposit of $500.00 already paid to him. He agreed that this sum shall only be paid on the trial day as there was no more to pay in accordance with the terms of the pre-contractual agreement dated 25.10.2004 at item (i) at page 93.
29. He confirmed this arrangement and acknowledged the existence of the pre-contractual arrangement at page 106. At pages 107 to 115 he manipulated the mind of my son Paul the Second Defendant on the pretext of obtaining instructions from him on how to deal with the case but instead he was asking him for more monies.

PAUL UNDER UNDUE INFLUENCE OF HIS FATHER TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT:

30. As stated earlier, Paul replied to the First Defendant to the effect that he was an involuntary participant in the Varied Solicitors Costs Agreement at page 108 at paragraph 8 when he said that it was “my father actually dealing with it.”
31. At page 116 and 117, he reneged his pre-contractual terms by presenting invoice 5023 by asking for another $243.00 for which Paul agreed to pay him $50.00 at the meeting with him at his home when Paul signed the AGREEMENT under undue influence by his father.
32. At page 118, it was clear to the Applicant and Mr. Thies that there was no consensus ad-idem achieved in the THE AGREEMENT and that Mr. Thies had tricked him to get the $500.00 deposit from him and is having other tricks in his sleeve to ask for more monies.
33. So the Applicant told him in no uncertain terms that at that time, it was not late for him to go away and not to bother about doing the work anymore at page 118 on 10.11.2004.
34. At page 119 the situation became clearer as Mr. Thies had not reached any consensual agreement with the Applicant. At page 181, Mr.Thies was told to go away if he is reneging on the deal and the last offer to him was $1,000.00 and he could take it or leave it. He was also told that he would be paid $300.00 per day for each day of trial and this was not made contingent on the outcome of the case.
35. So any work done by him was expressly forbidden to be done by him and without instructions by the Applicant for the fictitious invoices 5024, 5025 etc as they were created for the purpose of defrauding the Applicant.

FIRST DEFENDANT RETAINER TERMINATED BY APPLICANT

36. At page 182 on 4.3.2005 at 6.52 pm, he was told to return all original documents and files that was handed over to him but he refused to do so resulting in the Applicant giving up his and his son litigation with the Defendants in DC2065 of 2004 and settled the matter with the Defendants through their solicitors Hotz & Co for $1,000.00 only. The Applicant and his son therefore lost some $23,000.00 which was the claim that the Applicant and his son expected from the Defendants if Mr. Thies were to do his job correctly and in accordance with the terms of THE AGREEMENT.
37. The Applicant and his son were not willing to throw good money after bad monies and were prepared to accept the offer of settlement through Hotz & Co as solicitors for the Defendants. So, the Applicant and his son lost the subject matter of the litigation just to avoid having any more trouble with the First Defendant.
38. Because the First Defendant did not accept the last offer his retainer was terminated as on that date by the Applicant. Any work that Mr. Thies did after 10.11.2004 was at his own peril because he was told that he would not be paid in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
39. At page 183 to 199, he did not go away but breached the terms of the agreement by contacting Paul instead of the Applicant. There was no agreement between Paul and him as Paul was involuntary and was under the undue influence of his father. He knew of Paul’s weakness and was manipulating him at all material times.

PAUL TERMINATED RETAINER OF FIRST DEFENDANT

40. Paul terminated Mr. Thies’ retainer on 21.2.2005 at page 35 of Affidavit of the Applicant sworn filed and dated 23.7.2008 in CIV1903 of 208 for the subs. 36(1) MCA part of the proceedings.
41. At no time did the Applicant and the Second Defendant try to use the First Defendant without paying him according him just terms for just work as it is difficult to find an honest lawyer to find an honest job. There was no champertous terms as this issue had been dealt with by the LPCC at the complaint of the First Defendant.

APPLICANT NEVER PLAYED THE PUBLIC ROLE OF SOLICITOR AS HE IS THE SOLE ACTOR ACTING FOR HIMSELF AND HIS INACTIVE SON AT ALL MATERIAL TIMES

42. There is no issue of the Applicant having acted as a solicitor his son pro bono as he is mere helper or McKenzie friend and is in the role of a litigant in person and it was necessary for him to reveal his status as a qualified solicitor but not currently certificated and this does not mean that he is playing the public role of a solicitor when makings deals for his son and helping him in his daily tasks as he is equipped with legal knowledge. So there is no question of the father acting in conflict of interests against his own son’s interests as they are the same interests of the Chin family and there is no public role interests which could prevent me from being unbiased and I have no need for that capacity if I am helping my own son.
43. I refer to Annexure NNC-13 to NNC-13-15 in which I informed the LPCC that I was given the mandate to represent my son, the Second Defendant in these proceedings and in CIV 1112 of 2007 not as a solicitor for my son but as his helper or his amicus curiae which I am entitled to do because I do not play the public role of a solicitor although I have used my title with a disclaimer at all material times.




SWORN by the Deponent at Perth ]
In the State of Western Australia ]
This 26th day of May, 2010 ]……………………………………………..
Before me:
…………………………..
Justice of Peace/ Commissioner of the Supreme Court for Taking Affidavit